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The post-cold war era presented security challenges that at one level are a continuation of the 
cold war era; at another level, these phenomena manifested in new forms. Whether the issues 
of economics and trade, transfer of technologies, challenges of intervention, or humanitarian 
crisis, the countries of the South (previously pejoratively labelled “Third World” or “developing” 
countries) have continued to address these challenges within the framework of their capabilities 
and concerns. The volume explores defence diplomacies, national security challenges and 
strategies, dynamics of diplomatic manoeuvers and strategic resource management of Latin 
American, southern African and Asian countries.
This path-breaking work is a fresh addition to the comparative literature on defence and security 
studies that links concepts and cases, giving voice to scholars related to the Global South and not 
to the Western powers. Emphasising history, political economy, the military, (human) security and 
politics, contributors to this innovative volume demonstrate ‘how the past reappears because 
it is a hidden present’, to paraphrase novelist Octavio Paz. A capita selecta of case studies and 
dialogue engendered thereby hold much promise for academic researchers, theorists, expert 
practitioners, security and political practitioners, policymakers and students. Apart from 
comparative potential, the analyses reflect a purposeful blend of theory, history and substance 
– indeed a worthy and valuable venture in current times. 
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National Security in Complex Times
The South African military dimension
Shadrack Ramokgadi, Tobie Beukes and Ian Liebenberg
Abstract
Having returned to the international gallery of nations in 1996 after its apartheid pariah status was lifted, South Africa had 
to adjust its defence posture, defence diplomacy, and general national security framework to new conditions. The Cold War 
was over, interstate wars in the region were unlikely, and if undertaken at all, military deployment was to participate in 
peacekeeping operations. With the apartheid garrison state mentality a thing of the past, a new national security strategy 
became a necessity. This chapter discusses the need and guidelines for a national security strategy suited to a democracy 
and a developmental state aware of current and future socio-economic challenges, and its role in the region and on the 
African continent.
Introduction
In South Africa, an official National Security Strategy (NSS) is prepared and reviewed 
periodically by the executive authorities, who are required to outline national security 
priorities, and suggest policy responses. Post-1994, the NSS process began with the 
White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of  South Africa (1996), followed by 
the Defence Review 1998, and Defence Review 2015. The latest NSS is currently being 
developed, but it faces challenges. This chapter exclusively uses publicly available sources 
as it attempts a fresh look at a future NSS, highlighting lessons from the national security 
strategies of  other countries, and providing some comparative insights.
Methodology
The methodology used here is qualitative and involved an extensive literature study 
of  open source documents. While the goal was to gain insights on a possible security 
strategy for post-apartheid South Africa, we limited our country comparisons, choosing 
not to focus on core aggressive states, self-perceived ‘world policemen’, or societies that 
see themselves as beleaguered by a hostile world, such as the US. The authors assume that 
regional and international cooperation remain important tools, and that multipolarity in 
the future is a given.
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National security in a new democracy
This contribution will do the following:
	Define the concept of national security;
	Describe current and future challenges to national security;
	Discuss the mandate of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF); 
	Provide an outline of the role and functions of the military in national security; 
	Discuss the SANDF Military Strategy;
	Discuss security as a concept and its links with perceived national values;
	Discuss regional challenges; and
	 Indicate the threats that face the population of South Africa.
Defining the concept of ‘National Security’ 
The challenges experienced by states have changed since the end of  the Cold War and the 
temporary lessening of  the East-West divide. Increased globalisation and hyper-capitalism 
brought with them intensive international integration, yet simultaneously increased social 
alienation, fragmentation, and the rich-poor divide (Giddens, 1993). These have also led 
to new tensions and (armed) conflicts between multiple stakeholders (including non-state 
actors), often expanding into hybrid conflicts. 
‘National security’ has no single definition (D’Anieri, 2014:69), but a broad description of  a 
national security strategy, focusing on a diverse array of  global threats including political, 
social, economic, health and environment, is relevant for the purposes of  this chapter. 
The South African White Paper on Defence (1996: chapter 2) described national security 
as follows:
In the new South Africa national security is no longer viewed as a predominantly 
military and police problem. It … broadened to incorporate political, economic, 
social and environmental matters … Security [became] an all-encompassing 
condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate 
fully in the process of  governance; enjoy the protection of  fundamental rights; have 
access to resources and the basic necessities of  life; and inhabit an environment 
which is not detrimental to their health and well-being … At national level the 
objectives of  security policy therefore encompass the consolidation of  democracy; 
the achievement of  social justice, economic development and a safe environment; 
and a substantial reduction in the level of  crime, violence and political instability. 
Stability and development are regarded as inextricably linked and mutually 
reinforcing. At international level the objectives of  security policy include the 
defence of  the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of  the 
South African state, and the promotion of  regional security in Southern Africa.
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The above implies a move away from restrictive threat analysis to what may be described 
as a new and broader security realism, where the future safety of  people is linked not only 
to armed threats, but also to threats to human life and life quality within communities 
and regions.
Current and likely future challenges to national security
In the current context, the threats and risks to the state and society encompass the military, 
economic, political-cultural and resource-environmental sectors (Mulaudzi & Liebenberg, 
2017:29ff.; De Wet & Liebenberg, 2018; Mandrup, 2018:136ff.). However, economic, social 
and political dynamics also offer opportunities and challenges to enhance the interests 
of  South Africa. The South African approach to national security, we argue, should be 
based on an agreement between state and organised civil society (or civil community) 
on the protection of  social liberties and human security, and the readiness for managing 
threats and risks in the regional environment. Thus, economic, political-cultural and 
resource-environmental security must be clearly identified in terms of  both traditional 
and non-traditional threats and risks, as well as the positive challenges and opportunities 
that can enhance the interests of  South Africa, the region, and the continent. 
Current and likely future challenges to national security for South Africa include, but are 
not limited to:
	Regional instability (i.e. deterioration of quality of life and increasing poverty);
	Climate change and disasters;
	Energy supply and water/food sustainability;
	 Internal (violent) reactions related to service delivery, xenophobia, crime;
	Possible intervention by states outside the continent; and
	Possible cyber-attacks and terrorism.
The military and the Constitution
The Constitution of  the Republic of  South Africa, Act 108 of  1996 (hereafter, Constitution, 
1996) holds that:
a. The defence force is the only lawful military force in the Republic;
b. The defence force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force;
c. The primary object of  the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its 
territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the 
principles of  international law regulating the use of  force; 
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d. The President as head of  the national executive is Commander-in-Chief  of  the defence 
force, and must appoint the Military Command of  the force; and
e. Command of  the Defence Force must be exercised in accordance with the directions 
of  the Minister of  Defence under the authority of  the President.
South African National Defence Force functions
According to the Defence Act, Act 42 of  2002 (Section 18 (1) (d)), the SANDF may, subject 
to the Constitution, be employed: 
a. For service in the defence of  the Republic, for the protection of  its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity; 
b. For service in compliance with the international obligations of  the Republic with 
regard to international bodies and other states; 
c. For service in the preservation of  life, health or property; 
d. For service in the provision or maintenance of  essential services; 
e. For service in the upholding of  law and order in the Republic in cooperation with 
the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in a law where the said 
Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own;
f. For service in support of  any department of  state for the purpose of  socio-economic 
upliftment; and
g. To effect national border control.
Along with this, according to the Constitution (1996, Schedule 6, section 24):
(2) The National Defence Force shall exercise its powers and perform its functions 
solely in the national interest in terms of  Chapter 11 of  the Constitution of  the 
Republic of  South Africa, 1996.
(3) The employment for service, training, organisation and deployment of  the 
South African National Defence Force shall be effected in accordance with the 
requirements of  subsection (2).
The role of the military
Development requires stability, and stability requires sound state and social structures 
which are seen and experienced as legitimate by the citizenry (Mulaudzi & Liebenberg, 
2017). Thus, a well-trained and equipped military which holds legitimacy in the eyes 
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of  civil society is imperative. The military provides security for both internal crises (in 
cooperation with the South African Police Service [SAPS]) and external aggression or 
threats to peace, making it a potential tool to ensure regional and international security. 
After 1994, the new government replaced the militarist security project of  the apartheid 
government with a more holistic approach, using the lessons learnt through negative 
experiences and the flaws in civil-military relations under apartheid. Currently, the primary 
threat to security is not military and cannot be dealt with by purely military means. Along 
with this, in a constitutional state civil-military relations and safe communities hold more 
value than the ability to suppress with force, and the military is bound to accept civil 
control. This has an influence on the role of  the military, whether internal or external, 
and also impacts the national security strategy.
This new approach arose from the success of  the country’s negotiated settlement and the 
leadership preference for persuasion and negotiation. Force has been viewed as a limited 
mechanism, applicable only in exceptional situations, and rather than projecting military 
force, South Africa’s aim is to project diplomacy and enhance cooperation and peace, 
meaning that all other options should be exhausted before the use of  force. 
Strategic national security functions of the South African  
government and SANDF
Security in all forms is seen as a core function, and the armed forces and other state 
organs are required by government to contribute to this. The SANDF, as an arm of  the 
state, is required to respond to both internal and external security issues, as guided by 
national and international regulatory frameworks, and this provides the foundation for 
a comprehensive approach to national security. Arguably, the main role of  the SANDF 
is the use of  military capabilities to achieve identified policy objectives. One approach 
suggests that the security-creating role of  the government can fall into six strategic 
functions: China after a period of  relative disruptive Western Colonial intervention 
returned to what perhaps can be called the geographical space of  a perceived “greater” 
China as many ages before. While China became a republic, it was to experience a wide-
ranging and destructive Japanese invasion before World War II and a civil war between 
communists and nationalists that was to end with the defeated nationalists establishing 
a nationalist government in exile in 1949 on the island of  Taiwan (the latter seen by the 
Chinese government as an errant province). In a sense then the European imposed model 
of  nationalism (or in cases a paradigm widely accepted in current discourse) had long-
term consequences, some of  which we still see today: (1) Anticipation; (2) prevention; 
(3) deterrence; (4) protection; (5) intervention; and (6) stabilisation (Constitution, 1996; 
White Paper on Defence, 1996; Defence Review, 1998).
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Anticipation 
As a representative of  a community of  citizens, the government is to prepare for foreseen 
and unforeseen contingencies, including incidents that may threaten the interests of 
South Africa or international rule of  law. The role of  the SANDF is to prepare forces 
which can respond to any foreseeable circumstances for the protection of  its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, and if  needed, secondary roles of  various forms (Constitution, 
1996: Chapter 11, Section 201(2)).
Prevention 
The SANDF is required to proactively prevent possible future threats to the country or 
region. The Constitution (1996: Chapter 11, Section 2019(c)) provides for the deployment 
of  the SANDF for services in compliance with the international obligations of  the country, 
in line with international bodies and other member states. The most common obligation 
is the duty to protect people from any harm through prevention. Given the South African 
context and historical experience, the principle of  ‘self-defence’ demands the prevention, 
management and resolution of  conflict through non-violent means (White Paper on 
Defence, 1996: Chapter 4).
Deterrence 
The South African government is expected to discourage any actions that are in conflict 
with the interests of  the state or the international rule of  law (White Paper on Defence, 
1996:Chapter 4), including protection outside the geographical confines of  the country 
and its inhabitants.. In effecting this, the government of  SA states that the prevention 
of  conflict and war is a primary course of  action (Defence Review, 1998: Chapter 2). 
This includes self-defence, requiring a defence capability which is sufficiently credible to 
deter potential aggressors (Defence Review, 1998: Chapter 2). The credibility of  the core 
force capability must therefore be maintained at all times, as per the core-force approach 
(Ministry of  Defence, 2010). The Constitution prescribes the mobilisation of  the SANDF 
for service in upholding law and order within the country in cooperation with the SAPS, 
under circumstances where the police services are unable to do so alone (1996: Section 
201(2)(a)). Such cooperative arrangements require an awareness of  the limitations of  the 
armed forces for deployment within a civilian environment and should be treated with 
care in terms of  ‘deterrence’. 
Civilian control over the military remains paramount. The deployment of  the SANDF in 
cooperation with the SAPS should only be carried out with the awareness that military 
solutions to political problems are inherently limited. The Constitution (1996) prescribes 
that the president is the Commander-in-Chief  of  the defence force and appoints the 
Chief  of  the Defence Force. The White Paper on Defence, the Public Service Act, and 
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the Public Finance Management Act provide for the Secretary for Defence (a civilian), 
who shall exercise their functions and powers as Head of  Department and Accounting 
Officer (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 9). Along with this, the Constitution established a 
Defence Secretariat to assist the Minister of  Defence with functions related to issuing of 
orders, directives, and commands, and the execution of  budgetary programmes, as well as 
oversight, in close cooperation with parliament and defence-related committees. 
Protection 
South Africa views itself  as a member of  the international community, and the SANDF is 
therefore expected to participate in international peace operations. For the purposes of  the 
protection of  the people, peace support operations are characterised by military operations 
other than war (MOOTW). Participation in MOOTW is founded on the understanding 
that regional peace and security is important to SA, as any spill-over from neighbouring 
countries will impact on its territorial integrity and national security (RSA Constitution, 
1996; White Paper on Defence, 1996; Defence Review 1997/1998).
One has to note that international peace support operations are not limited to the 
deployment of  troops, and can include providing equipment, medical personnel and 
facilities, logistical support, engineering services, communication systems, and staff  (RSA 
Constitution, 1996; White Paper on Defence, 1996; Defence Review 1997/1998).
Intervention 
A function of  the state is to carry out offensive operations to enforce change in the 
behaviour of  actors or alliances that threaten the interests of  the state, the region or, 
where applicable, international rule of  law (Ministry of  Defence, 2010). This can include 
peace support operations, which for the purposes of  intervention are characterised by 
peace enforcement entailing the application or threat of  coercion (Ministry of  Defence, 
2010). The application of  such force should aim to promote international peace and abide 
by international resolution (RSA Constitution, 1996; White Paper on Defence, 1996; 
Defence Review 1997/1998; Ministry of  Defence, 2010).
Stabilisation 
In terms of  the above the South African security forces may be requested to assist in 
re-establishing security in any of  the affected countries in the region. Thus, stabilisation 
refers to common security, regional defence cooperation, and confidence- and security-
building measures in Southern Africa (RSA Constitution, 1996; White Paper on Defence, 
1996; Defence Review 1997/1998; Ministry of  Defence, 2010). In this context, the SA 
government is to be committed to political, economic and military cooperation with 
neighbouring states. 
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The Constitution (1996) also states that the SANDF may be employed in other roles in 
addition to self-defence, deployment in cooperation with the SAPS, and international 
peace support operations. These activities include disaster relief, the provision and 
maintenance of  essential services, search and rescue, evacuation of  South African 
citizens from high-threat areas, protection of  maritime resources, and regional defence 
cooperation (Constitution, 1996). 
Figure 7.1, compiled by the authors (see below), represents a summary of  the proposed 
strategic functions of  the South African government and the SANDF. Government is 
responsible for national security; the SANDF for activities to attain such goals, keeping in 
mind civilian control over the military.
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA
1. Defence of the state, territorial integrity and citizens. 
2. Support to national and regional interests. 







FIGURE 7.1 Strategic functions of the SANDF in pursuit of the National Security Agenda
SANDF and national security frameworks
At present, the South African Defence Review (2015) is the only national policy framework 
that guides the development of  the NSS into an implementation and funding model 
in South Africa. Thus, the operational activities of  the SANDF should be aligned with 
the prescripts of  the Defence Review. For example, the alignment of  the military’s 
operational activities with the agenda for sustainable development within the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) is important, along with military intervention 
in promoting international peace and security. While the Defence Review 2015 remains 
the only official statement that defines security concerns and prescribes the nature of 
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acceptable policy responses, the White Paper on National Defence is the cornerstone in 
providing comprehensive and long-range planning on matters related to defence doctrine, 
force design, force levels, logistic support, armaments, equipment, human resources and 
funding (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 1). 
The aim in designing the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review 1998 was to 
achieve national consensus on defence matters, subjected to consultation with multiple 
stakeholders and other interest groups (Defence Review, 1998). Defence reviews present 
proposals on themes such as defence posture and doctrine, force design options, and civil 
military relations, and act as an attempt to determine the appropriate size, structure, force 
design and posture of  an armed force. 
Defence posture and doctrine 
In terms of  defence posture, the SANDF should abide by the government’s primary chosen 
course, which is the prevention and deterrence of  conflict and war, and the government 
should go to war only when non-violent strategies and deterrence on all available levels 
have failed (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 2). Thus, this needs to find expression in the 
NSS, keeping in mind political, economic, social and cultural rights, and primary needs 
of  South Africa’s citizens; the commitment to goals of  arms control and disarmament at 
national, regional and international levels; and the country’s vision to pursue peaceful 
relations with other states, including through military cooperation (Defence Review, 
1998:Chapter 2). 
In protecting the state and its people against external threats, the SANDF is to employ 
the following NSS guidelines (Defence Review, 1998): (1) Military cooperation with other 
states in pursuit of  common security; (2) prevention, management, and resolution of 
conflict through non-violent means, such as diplomacy, mediation and arbitration; and 
(3) force employment, as the very last option. Similarly, the Constitution requires that the 
deterrent capability be established in line with international law on armed conflict, and 
related international humanitarian law (1996: Chapter 11, Section 200 (2)). For example, 
the show of  force through joint multinational military exercises should also respect 
international environmental rules and regulations.
South Africa’s defence doctrine is derived from its defence posture and the related policy 
frameworks, and encompasses the main principles and concepts that guide the conduct of 
military operations in support of  national objectives. The SANDF doctrine is also founded 
on the Constitution’s commitment to international rule of  law governing aggression, 
and provides for military capability that is able to halt, contain and reverse the effects of 
offensive actions at operational level of  conflict, although this approach does not rule out 
offensive operations as the last instance (Constitution, 1996).
I. Liebenberg, D. Kruijt & S. Paranjpe (eds). 2020. Defence Diplomacy and National Security Strategy. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.
https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480556/07 Copyright 2020 African Sun Media and the authors
136 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
Force design options 
The SANDF is required to plan and prepare force structure elements (e.g. land, sea, air, 
and cyber defence; and health support) that are ready at all times to act in defence of  South 
Africa and to respond to other defence contingencies (Defence Review, 1998). Force design 
is based on readiness to execute the primary functions of  the SANDF, namely defence 
of  the state, its people and its territorial integrity against military aggression (Defence 
Review, 1998). Force design options are also influenced by the required level of  defence, 
the approved defence posture, and the defence budget. For the latter, a funding model 
remains a challenge to be addressed.
Given economic and political-constitutional constraints, political judgment and military 
expertise are at play throughout the process, implying the development of  various 
scenarios, policy responses or conceived courses of  action. Needless to say, the approval of 
a specific option is primarily determined by the maintenance of  the specified capabilities at 
the approximate level (Defence Review, 1998). Force design is a multidimensional system 
and should be open for review and innovation, enabling flexible responses to various 
security challenges or threats. Affordability is dependent on the long-term sustainability 
of  the design, while upgrading and replacement of  equipment is dictated by the lifespan 
of  the capability itself, both man and material (Defence Review, 1998). Thus, force design 
process should translate into manageable options, and strategic gaps and related risks 
need to be consistently considered (Defence Review, 1998).
Civil military relations 
The democratic transition in South Africa is relevant here, despite conceivable shortcomings 
since 1996 (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 9). Civilian control over the military is the 
assumed cornerstone of  democratic practices in South Africa. Civilian control relates to 
constitutional and legal transformation, oversight mechanisms, normative and cultural 
transformation, and future organisational restructuring (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 
9). The SANDF is required to remain subordinate to the elected government and should 
retain ultimate respect for the principle of  civil supremacy. This view should be reinforced 
through training and development programmes in the SANDF, with emphasis placed on 
the respect for civil control, as entrenched in the SANDF code of  conduct for uniformed 
members (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 9). In this regard, continuous rejuvenation, 
persistent education of  personnel, and the creation of  a tertiary-educated officer corps is 
of  utmost importance, and currently in need of  urgent attention.
The Constitution (1996) prescribes that the president is the Commander-in-Chief  of 
the defence force and appoints the Chief  of  the Defence Force. The White Paper on 
Defence, the Public Service Act, and the Public Finance Management Act provide for the 
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Secretary for Defence (a civilian), who shall exercise their functions and powers as Head 
of  Department and Accounting Officer (Defence Review, 1998:Chapter 9). Along with 
this, the Constitution established a Defence Secretariat to assist the Minister of  Defence 
with functions related to issuing of  orders, directives, and commands and the execution 
of  budgetary programmes, as well as oversight, in close cooperation with parliament and 
defence-related committees. 
The SANDF Military Strategy (SANDFMS) and envisioned 
national values
The SANDFMS (2002) plans for eventualities in the military environment and attempts to 
provide answers to military challenges in the foreseeable future. The strategy hierarchy 
stems from the Constitution, the Defence Act, White Paper, Defence Review, and other 
statutory prescripts, and is fed by national values. In turn, the Department of  Defence 
(DOD) Military Strategy provides and employs force strategies inclusive of  support 
strategies (SANDFMS, 2002). Military strategy documents provide the strategic profile 
through the DOD’s Vision of  Effective defence for a democratic South Africa, as a 
constitutional democratic state (SANDFMS, 2002).
The SANDFMS closely relates to the constitutional values of  the country, and reflects 
on the use of  the military outside its borders, seeking peace, and preventing or resolving 
conflict rather than acting belatedly and in a heavy-handed manner see in this regards the 
chapter by Liebenberg and Fonseca on South Africa’s defence diplomacy). In the case of 
South Africa, these values are to be underpinned by the notions of  democratisation of 
state and society, the constitutional state-principle, and unity in social diversity.
South Africa is a diverse community (Zegeye, Liebenberg & Houston, 2000; Van der 
Heyden, 2018), and one of  the constitutional norms is unity in diversity. The SANDF 
should therefore reflect the values of  diversity, tolerance, service to the community, 
representivity on all levels, and accountability for its actions (Polley, 1988; Corder, 1989; 
Van Zyl-Slabbert, 1992; Duncan & Seleoane, 1998; Seleoane, 2001; Houston, Liebenberg 
& Humphries, 2001). These national values need to be reflected within the SANDF and its 
deployment in the region, and should be seen to be part of  practice and attitude wherever 
defence force members may find themselves. Other terms that crop up in the national 
discourse and that have a bearing on the SANDF are a non-racialist approach, respect for 
personal freedom and community safety, social cohesion, and a strong sense of  service 
delivery. On a critical note, the interaction between civil society and the military should 
remain favourable, although a growing civil-military gap can be observed in South Africa, 
which needs urgent attention.
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SANDF Military Strategy
At the core of  SANDFMS are the military strategic objectives and military strategic 
capabilities, contained in the Strategic Plan 2011-2015 (DOD, 2011). The SANDF Military 
Strategic Objectives are to be aligned to a corresponding NSS, and are intended to highlight 
(1) the enhancement and maintenance of  comprehensive defence capability; (2) promotion 
of  peace, security and stability in the region and continent; and (3) providing support to 
the people of  the Republic of  South Africa (DOD, 2011). 
The Military Strategic Missions are to be founded on a mission-based approach, using 
peace and war-time time missions to direct the strategy for force preparation and force 
structure (DOD, 2011), and accommodating both primary and secondary functions 
of  the SANDF. The missions are to be aligned to a mandate-driven approach set out 
by parliament, and are to be implemented in non-conventional tasks, health support 
duties, peace support operations, special operations, defence diplomacy, support to 
other government departments, disaster relief  and humanitarian assistance, presidential 
tasks, and conventional operations. The Military Strategic Concepts (Mission Based 
Approach) are guidelines on how to accomplish the Military Strategic Objectives. Specific 
concepts are mission-essential training, mission trained force, selective engagement and 
strategic positioning.
National values and interests; security arrangements regional and 
continental
South Africa changed from a society based on racial segregation to a constitutional state 
through an extended process of  transition (1990-1996). New values and legal frameworks 
had to be negotiated in tenuous circumstances, a process which has yet to be completed. 
Some core values which entered the discourse during the transition are principled 
non-racialism and an ethos of  service to the community. Along with this, various religious, 
linguistic and cultural entities exist in South Africa, and the Constitution requires that 
the public sector, which includes the military and broader security community, enact 
tolerance of  differences, as well as equality between peoples of  different communities. 
The South African socio-political vocabulary was extended with terms such as equity, 
service delivery (batho pele), ubuntu,1 accountability, development, sustainable growth, and 
knowledge transfer. 
These terms outline national values to be achieved, and future national values to be nurtured, 
and these should also be reflected within the SANDF in terms of  internal and external 
interaction with other communities and the evolving security community in Southern 
Africa. South African’s national values share a link with the broader security community.
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In terms of  regional involvement, South Africa abides by regional structures as well as the 
protocols of  the African Union (AU), and also adheres to international agreements and 
the protocols of  the United Nations (UN). In cases of  intervention, diplomatic or military 
(i.e. peacekeeping or peace enforcement), South Africa is bound by its Constitution and 
by international agreements, and adherence to the role of  a constitutional state and a 
facilitator of  peacemaking on the continent should be the focus. However, values and 
interpretation of  reality remain complex, and the country may also find itself  in a situation 
where the push of  powerful states will clash with South Africa’s role as peacemaker. South 
Africa’s NSS will therefore have to decide on how to deal with similar future challenges. 
Regional challenges
Observers pointed out that South Africa has to move from a diplomacy of  a dominant 
power in the region to one of  engagement in diplomatic, political and military activities 
such as peacekeeping (Malan & Cilliers, 1997). 
The expectations for the NSS are high, but the authors have important limitations to 
consider. There are massive economic differences between states in Southern Africa even 
while South Africa holds a lion’s part of  the collective GDP in the region.2 Because of  this 
other member states may expect much from South Africa in terms of  a financial contri-
bution to the region and the continent. In reality, the South African defence budget has not 
increased significantly over the past five years and is unlikely to experience large increases 
soon (see Appendix below). In terms of  maintenance, the replacement and modernisation 
of  equipment and manpower/human resource expenses limit the SANDF’s capacity, and 
this must be kept in mind, both in defence diplomacy and in conceptualising an NSS. 
Since the Declaration and Treaty of  the SADC (1992) and the launch of  the Organ 
for Peace, Defence and Security (OPDS) (1996), South Africa has been woven into the 
regional security architecture. In recognition of  Chapter VIII of  the UN Charter, southern 
African states agreed on the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, 
which confirms respect for sovereignty, equality, interdependence, non-aggression and 
non-interference in the affairs of  other states. The achievement of  solidarity, peace and 
security, and the recognition of  cooperation in political, defence and security measures 
both form part of  this understanding. Add to this the promotion of  peaceful settlement 
of  disputes by negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration, and the full picture 
becomes challenging in a region where there are large-scale economic disparities and 
occasional differences of  opinion. The objectives of  the protocol relate to curbing cross-
border crime and promoting communities based on domestic security, as well as enhancing 
and nurturing regional capacity in terms of  disaster management and international 
humanitarian assistance.
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Against this background, South Africa is expected to play a role in both the region and 
the AU. Future security thinking will revolve around economic interdependence, closer 
cooperation, integration (without worsening social marginalisation) and awareness of 
outside influences and pressures. While positive growth rates are being experienced in 
the majority of  countries in the region, these often do not translate into an abundance of 
funding for military and peacekeeping purposes. Interdependence is likely to remain in 
southern Africa for many years to come, and people will look towards South Africa for its 
contribution. Under current conditions, the expectations on what South Africa can do are 
unrealistically high. A consistent balance needs to be struck here when an NSS is framed. 
Threats that face the population of South Africa
Traditionally, the concept of  security has been interpreted in militarist terms, namely the 
simple military defence of  the state or the offensive use of  military power. However, since 
the 1994 Human Development Report of  the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the 
concept of  security has included human security, which implies a condition of  freedom 
from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety or their lives. It is seen as an all-
encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; 
participate fully in the process of  governance; enjoy protection of  fundamental rights; 
have access to resources and the basic necessities of  life; and inhabit an environment that 
is not detrimental to their health and well-being. 
Within the human security paradigm, the South African population face some potential 
and real threats, and an NSS should reflect an awareness of  these potential threats and 
contingencies. Examples are health (including HIV/AIDS), lack of  social services at all 
levels of  government, social insecurity (high levels of  poverty and crime), and corruption 
(syphoning money from social upliftment and economic growth). Within this broad 
architecture, the roles and duties of  the military should be outlined to ensure that military 
action in a secondary role remains within the set parameters, yet will be functional, 
effective and professionally available when the need arises.
By 2004, it was reported that South Africa had the highest HIV prevalence rates in the 
world, with 20% of  the adult population (roughly five million people) being HIV positive 
(Nattrass, 2004). Although the health budget has increased and antiretroviral treatment 
has been rolled out, the situation is still not satisfactory. In 2001, there were 4.1 million 
people living with HIV in South Africa (9.4% of  the total population), and this increased to 
5.24 million by 2010, representing 10.5% of  South Africans (SAIRR, 2010:52). The highest 
rates were recorded in KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the Free State, with the Western 
Cape having the lowest prevalence rate of  6% (SAIRR, 2010:55). According to the SAIRR’s 
future demographic projections, the situation is likely to worsen substantially from 2020 
to 2040 (SAIRR, 2010:56). 
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AIDS impacts heavily on existing human capital, infecting mainly young adults, and 
affecting people’s health and productivity, resulting in them becoming a burden on the 
state. It destroys a section of  people capable of  contributing to the economic and social 
life of  the community, while care for the frail and sick demands financial resources from 
the state, the taxpayer, and the private sector. More worrying is the social dislocation 
caused by the loss of  fathers, mothers, caregivers, guardians or children, which damages 
the social fabric of  society. The disease has the potential to disrupt economic growth, the 
maintenance of  a labour force and human/intellectual capital and contribute to greater 
inequality. The latter can in turn act as a trigger for internal conflict.
When considering an NSS, the military needs to make its contribution through educating 
its own personnel and their families, and the communities within which they are active, 
around diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The military health services should also be available 
to assist in problem areas, and with initiatives of  government health services in a clearly 
defined and publicly acceptable secondary role, especially in rural areas.
Other threats, such as climate change and its conceivable negative spin-offs, also need to 
be factored in. The extent of  such challenges (e.g. drought and floods followed by scarcity 
of  resources) are not fully predictable, and the consideration of  multidisciplinary task 
teams to act as early warning forums are necessary.
Communities and social divisions
Social conflict is multifaceted, and one of  the main challenges to democratic consolidation 
in South Africa is the cultural divisions within the country. The country is divided across 
a variety of  linguistic, ethnic, racial and religious lines, and there is a sharp rich-poor 
gap which creates tension and conflict through real or relative depravation. One of  the 
worrying trends in South Africa is a growing class of  people without access to any job or 
occupation – the jobless class. The existence of  a jobless class can further tensions between 
those with jobs – even if  only part-time or poorly paid – and those without access to 
jobs. The result of  these tensions, confounded by suboptimal service delivery, may lead to 
active alienation from government or the state, and even active distrust of  the state and 
the electoral process.
Another challenge is the inflow of  migrants, both legal and illegal, which can trigger 
tensions and xenophobia, as the newcomers are seen as people who take jobs, and hence 
economic opportunities, from South Africans. In the past, this led to violent confrontations 
and tensions remain. The issue of  national security is linked here with social tolerance 
and human security. While creating tolerance through education and with optimum 
immigration control, the military are also called upon to ensure the efficient patrolling of 
South Africa’s borders, which have become porous since 1998. Those aware of  national 
security challenges need to factor this in too.
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In case of  violent conflict within communities, the military (including the medical support 
services) may be called upon to assist in a strictly secondary role, and the ability and 
capability of  officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to negotiate, manage and 
facilitate conflict is important here. In this regard, training should be offered to officers 
and NCOs where possible, and the same applies where the military may be called upon to 
assist in crime reduction.
The framework for an NSS should take cognisance of  all of  the above. One of  the adverse 
consequences of  divisions or perceived schisms in society is political intolerance, with the 
potential for social conflict. In deeply divided societies, people typically develop strong 
in-group identities, often leading to strong out-group animosity that can culminate in 
alienation and violent civil conflict. The protracted conflicts in the region, such as in 
Sudan, are attributed to attempts by one group to subjugate or impose its will on other 
groups. With its numerous ethnic and linguistic groups and deep social stratification, 
South Africa may face similar challenges. As a constitutional extension of  the state, the 
military should be aware of  this and contribute to tolerance, inter-group communication, 
and maintenance and nurturing of  principled non-racialism and caregiving to smaller or 
marginalised groups and communities. 
Like schools, religious groups, the media and sport organisations, the military is an agent 
of  socialisation for their personnel, their families and peer groups. It is important that 
the values of  life-long education, knowledge sharing, tolerance and accommodation are 
reflected actively into the organisation and into the community.
The Grim Reaper(s): Unemployment, inequality and poverty
The policy of  separate development implemented by the apartheid regime created one 
of  the most unequal societies in the world, and South Africa’s macro-economic policies 
since 1996 further contributed to inequalities. In 1996, 1,8 million South Africans were 
earning less than US$1 a day, but by 2005, the figure had risen to 4,2 million people 
( Johnson, 2010). The unique feature of  this inequality is that, unlike in other countries, the 
disenfranchised group in South Africa is the numerical majority. This has left a large part 
of  the society in a situation characterised by poverty and limited chances of  emancipation. 
A further characteristic of  inequality in South Africa is that inequalities within groups 
also deepened while, according to a Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) report, 
households originally living in poverty had sunk deeper into poverty (Schwabe, 2004). ‘In 
the past inequality in South Africa was largely defined along race lines. It has increasingly 
become defined by inequality within population groups as the gap between rich and poor 
within each group has increased’ (Schwabe, 2004).3
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Inequality has serious consequences, such as lack of  social capital, lack of  upward 
mobility, and social disorganisation, which frequently spill over into secondary problems 
such as crime, health threats, or intercommunity tensions. Despite the efforts of  the new 
democratic government, couched in the National Development Plan, these challenges 
largely remained by 2018, and current inequality remains a serious challenge (Mulaudzi & 
Liebenberg. 2017:29ff.). 
Along with this, unemployment in South Africa is very high, and rising. The country 
arguably has one of  the highest rates of  unemployment in the world, which in 2002 was 
41% on a broad definition, and 30% on a narrow definition. Unemployment is especially 
high in rural areas and informal settlements. (Landman, Bhorat, Van der Berg & Van 
Aardt, 2003). 
The economy is unable to productively absorb the current labour force, which is 
different from the patterns that exist in most developing countries, where scarcity of 
jobs in the formal sector translates into large informal sectors, rather than high levels 
of  unemployment. Unemployment in South Africa remains a matter of  serious concern 
due to its effects on economic welfare, production, human capital, social exclusion, crime 
and social instability. The level of  unemployment and its rise is the most serious problem 
facing the country. Following the first democratic elections in 1994, the government’s 
efforts to eliminate poverty have been frustrated by the ongoing shedding of  jobs from the 
formal economy, resulting in continued poverty for sections of  the population. Landman 
et al.(2003) came to the conclusion that 40% of  people in South Africa are living in poverty, 
with the poorest 15% in a desperate struggle to survive, and the authors suggested that 
the most challenges facing South Africa following transition to democracy is to break the 
grip of  poverty. Despite short spurts of  growth, unemployment remains a major social 
challenge (Mulaudzi & Liebenberg, 2017:29ff.).
People who perceive their poverty as permanent or increasing may ultimately be driven 
by hostile impulses, rather than rational pursuit of  their interests. Thus, a high level of 
poverty can result in the breakdown of  values, and other undesirable behaviours such as 
high levels of  crime.
Land
One of  the damaging legacies of  colonial and apartheid history in South Africa is the 
inequitable distribution of  land between race groups. In addition to being a source of 
social tension, the result is that impoverished communities have little opportunity for 
providing for themselves through subsistence and commodity production. Many rural 
people are essentially landless, and those who have land find it too small or poor for 
production. In addition, these families and communities lack financial support for training 
and productivity.
I. Liebenberg, D. Kruijt & S. Paranjpe (eds). 2020. Defence Diplomacy and National Security Strategy. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.
https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480556/07 Copyright 2020 African Sun Media and the authors
144 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
Land reform is an accepted necessity, but when land reform takes place in an unplanned 
and haphazard way, tensions are created. Simultaneously, weak planning of  land reform 
can have dire consequences for the agricultural output of  the country and its ability to 
produce enough food for use and export. There should be awareness of  the sensitivity 
of  the issue in South Africa, which must be factored into the national and community 
security architecture.
It has been pointed out that, in view of  the expected increase of  the South African 
population (natural growth, as well as incoming people) between now and 2025, South 
African agricultural outputs need to increase drastically, but the need for growth in 
agricultural output acts as a double challenge. Agricultural output has to be enhanced, yet 
it may be tempered by land reform if  the latter is not managed well and implemented with 
care. One challenge relates to a concrete negative outcome, namely food insecurity, while 
another relates to possible dissatisfaction with the speed of  land reform. These challenges 
cannot be neglected and future needs and wants will have to be balanced carefully (De 
Wet & Liebenberg, 2017). 
Crime
Crime is one of  the most difficult challenges facing SA, with a crime rate amongst the 
highest in the world, and all South Africans are vulnerable to its effects. In 2007, South 
Africans had to live with the reality of  around 19,000 murders per year, roughly 200,000 
robberies and aggravated robberies, 300,000 burglaries (some violent), 85,000 stolen cars 
and 55,000 rapes (Altbecker, 2007:37-38). Crime diverts resources to protection efforts, 
increases health costs, and generally creates an environment unconducive to productive 
activity, and the exodus of  professionals and specialists is largely attributed to this factor. 
All of  this has the potential to discourage investment and hinder long-term growth in 
the country. 
Rising crime rates are often typical in countries undergoing transition, as democracy tends 
to compound crime by weakening the overbearing controls put in place by a previously 
oppressive government, and even relatively affluent citizens have an incentive to participate 
in crime when controls are weakened. The South African crime situation is aggravated by 
relatively easy access to illegal firearms and the existence of  numerous crime syndicates. 
Surveys suggest that South Africans are particularly exposed to violent crime and murder, 
and while crime statistics over the past years have shown a slight improvement, there is no 
room for complacency. Crime causes feelings of  insecurity and undermines confidence in 
democratic governance and government policies. 
The military can set an example to society by maintaining a crimeless military community. 
However, the military cannot and should not act as a police force, although it will have 
I. Liebenberg, D. Kruijt & S. Paranjpe (eds). 2020. Defence Diplomacy and National Security Strategy. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.
https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480556/07 Copyright 2020 African Sun Media and the authors
145National Security in Complex Times
to be considered as an element to support the police in exceptional cases. Inwardly, the 
military as an institution should demonstrate that the military institution strives to be free 
of  crime and corruption. 
Corruption
The prevalence of  corruption – or even the perception of  corruption – can lead to deep 
discontent and loss of  legitimacy for governments. To maintain legitimacy, governments 
should be able to prove that they are making positive changes to the negative experiences 
of  citizens. The threat of  criminalisation of  state and society cannot be ignored. Not 
addressing it can invite social discontent and alienation. Post-apartheid South Africa saw 
many trials and tribulations, including high levels of  corruption, especially under President 
Zuma’s rule. The current investigation into ‘state capture’ hopes to unveil the truth, and 
the commission will ideally propose concrete steps to prevent future corruption. To 
create a secure society, these challenges cannot be ignored when reflecting on and framing 
security in South Africa.
While the military is not a tool to be used for corruption prevention, its role as a socialisation 
agent and example setter should not be underestimated. Leading by example by stamping 
out corruption is important. 
Extremism and violence
Since the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, the likelihood of  extremist attacks 
has reduced substantially in South Africa. Some tensions remain, but the incorporation of 
most of  the dominant white political parties has diminished the likelihood of  right-wing 
extremism, although it must be mentioned that the majority of  then white parties, with the 
exception of  supporters of  authoritarianism, in principle agreed with a parliamentary and 
representative system. There are also no left-wing groupings that advocate violent regime 
change, even if  the rhetoric is fairly militant (i.e. the Economic Freedom Fighters or EFF); 
rather, the ‘left’ opposition generally work within the ambit of  the democratic and labour 
structures available in South Africa. Some may argue that Muslim fundamentalists pose 
a danger to South African communities, but in terms of  cultural and religious tolerance, 
the Muslim and Christian communities generally coexist peacefully in South Africa, and 
to a large extent are socially enmeshed/integrated.
Unfortunately, as a result of  the US’s ‘war on terror’, Muslim people are frequently 
associated in foreign media with ‘terrorism’ or as ‘political Islamists’, and such labelling 
causes intolerance and alienation. However, it seems unlikely that the South African state 
can be labelled as an extension of  those countries that are waging a war on terror, given its 
non-alliance stance and interactions with other states (Latin-America, Middle East, China, 
Europe, India, Russia, African peers). Close association with countries that have declared 
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a war on terror may be seen as guilt-by-association by their targets, but South Africa has 
so far steered clear of  such associations in its multilateral relations and involvement on 
the continent. 
Keeping a distance from states that habitually project military power outwards will benefit 
national security in South Africa and should be continuously on the agenda. Experience 
over the past two decades has shown that countries that uncritically associate themselves 
with the US’s war on terror can become targets as a result of  guilt by association, and 
the bomb attacks in Spain are but one example. The US chose to project military power 
far outside its own borders against those perceived to be part of  a ‘terrorist onslaught’, 
and such power projection frequently caused social dislocation, insecurity, alienation, and 
destruction in the targeted communities, deeper animosity, alienation, and the urge to 
retaliate. Close association with those that fight a war on terror may well cause discontent 
in other communities, and apartheid is an example of  a case where a wide definition of 
terrorism was uncritically applied. Attempts to suppress ‘terrorism’ eventually had the 
opposite effect, galvanising communities against the apartheid state and its policies.
The vulnerability of  African states to extremism is attributed partly to porous borders, 
weak authority in governance and public finance, seemingly irrepressible internal conflict 
over scarce resources, criminal groups attempting to gain access to scarce resources 
(diamond, ivory, etc.), the reluctance of  long-serving leaders/governments to step 
down after losing legitimacy or national elections, and the easy availability of  weapons. 
Extremism is frequently founded on a lack of  economic perspectives, social deprivation, 
a loss of  cultural identity, political repression, and a dysfunctional state. Like any country, 
South Africa is a possible target for extremist action, but government foreign policy, 
African policies, and the constitutional commitment to religious and economic equality 
play important roles in reducing such a risk. 
However, the likelihood of  local protest over dissatisfaction with service delivery and 
infrastructure is greater and needs to be kept in mind. It is also important not to label 
such instances as extremism, or as that of  people intent on anarchy or ‘manipulated by 
dark forces’. The focus here should be on preventing and resolving such protest through 
awareness of  the context, and by addressing the root of  the problem, which is lack of 
services. It is of  utmost importance that local discontent be solved through addressing the 
root causes, rather than forceful action and/or attaching negative labels to the discontented. 
The role of  the military here can be educational or to lend a hand in community initiatives 
in order to improve perceptions and to demonstrate a willingness to assist, on the condition 
that such educational help is according to constitutional obligations and is non-partisan. 
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Nuclear weapons and national security
In the aftermath of  the Cold War, the immediate risk of  a nuclear war subsided. Despite 
the reality of  mutually assured destruction (MAD), there was the possibility that a 
nuclear war could be triggered unintentionally or mistakenly. As a relatively small state 
(‘middle power’) under apartheid, South Africa, like Israel, was a nuclear-holding nation, 
projecting an aggressive foreign policy in the region. Since then, South Africa has signed 
the non-proliferation treaty and other relevant treaties, and is a non-nuclear power.
In reality, the mass holders of  nuclear power are still in the West, while Russia also retains 
significant, if  not competitive, numbers. Relative ‘newcomers’, such as India and China, 
do not seem inclined to use their nuclear power other than as a deterrent under serious 
provocation, and as a last resort. New ‘newcomers’, such as North Korea, do not have 
even vaguely competitive capacities, and if  offensive nuclear capacity is reached, they will 
be unlikely to stockpile significant numbers. Thus, given the reality of  limited arsenals 
and despite being labelled as ‘rogue states’, it remains highly unlikely that such a state 
will unleash a nuclear war, with the possible exception of  Israel, which operates within a 
framework of  ‘being besieged’ and threatened. 
In short, the nuclear threat that new newcomers pose is overrated when measured against 
current stockpiles of  nuclear arms. More likely, such attempts at building nuclear capacity 
are to boost confidence, as these countries are consistently criticised and threatened 
and may thus have developed the feeling of  being besieged, which will have worsened 
the feelings of  exclusion and isolation of  their governments and significant chunks of 
their population. South Africa faces no nuclear threat in the short to medium term, as 
it is not geographically near to any of  these powers, nor is it in competition with them. 
Realistically, the likelihood in the long-term is also limited. Any ‘hard’ military threat that 
may arise is likely to be from stronger powers in search of  scarce resources, or who have 
strong ideological differences with South Africa or its leadership, and in this case the threat 
would be economic, rather than nuclear. 
The vision, mission, structures and posture of  South Africa’s defence should include 
both conventional and non-conventional capabilities. The military have responsibilities 
to participate in peacekeeping operations and carry out border security. The capabilities 
for this need to be retained and honed in a cost-effective way, and the defence policy 
and NSS should take heed of  this. Added to this is the challenge of  planning a policy of 
rejuvenation within the current defence budget, as an increase is highly unlikely in the 
short to medium term, and savings will have to be incurred through piecemeal methods 
such as salary cuts for top management, and natural attrition in higher age categories.
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In terms of  disaster management, the military, in cooperation with civilian institutions, 
should be prepared to assist in case of  a nuclear disaster, both on and off  our soil. South 
Africa has one nuclear reactor, and may add more given the current power crisis, and 
the reality is that having nuclear power goes with the possibility of  a nuclear disaster. 
A nuclear disaster around our shores also cannot be ruled out, as various maritime vessels 
that pass along the sea routes of  South Africa are nuclear-powered of  which some are 
ageing fast.
Armed intervention by core states
The risk of  direct invasion does not face South Africa. However, as both Kosovo and Libya 
have proven, the responsibility to protect (R2P) can be used as a rationale to intervene in 
other smaller states that are rich in resources. In the case of  Iraq, the action was taken by 
core industrial states (US, UK) with others in alliance (‘the willing’) using the excuse of 
weapons of  mass destruction (WMD). In Libya’s case, it was an abuse of  the R2P.
Given the shortage of  certain resources on the globe, African and regional states should 
be aware of  this threat. Any attack on an African state can have negative consequences 
in surrounding states, as the Libyan example now demonstrates. Preparedness for such 
interference and contingencies in this regard should be considered and planned for.
Conclusion
South Africa’s citizenry currently faces no direct threat from nuclear or conventional 
attack. Some countries on the continent may be vulnerable to armed intervention by 
core states, under pretences such as the war on terror or R2P, or simply because they 
hold scarce resources. However, South Africa faces numerous other socio-political and 
economic challenges. The country’s population currently does not face a conventional 
threat or reactionary violence and, given South Africa’s diplomatic stance and multiple 
relations on the globe, they are also not a priority for what is described as ‘terrorism’.
Being viewed as a regional powerhouse, South Africa can expect to be called upon within 
SADC and on the continent (AU) to provide mutual security, and to contribute to peace 
operations and/or disaster relief. Such requests are likely to increase rather than decrease.
South Africans face numerous human security challenges. An NSS should be aware of 
this and, as far as the SANDF is concerned, it is in these areas that it may need to be 
prepared to render services within prescribed parameters when called upon. In terms 
of  its constitutional position and social responsibilities, the SANDF has a role to play in 
leading by example in terms of  health, service delivery, accountability, corruption and 
crime-eradication, and community interaction. Projected inside the country, this example 
should also be seen to be visible both in the region and more broadly. 
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This appendix provides an overview of  successive South African defence budgets and their 
effects on the SANDF during the period 2008-2017. Defence underfunding and its effects 
constitute arguably the most significant military security development in post-Mandela 
South Africa, and analysing the defence policy and its outcomes without taking defence 
spending into account is less than useful.
Sustained underfunding and a shrinking budget 
TABLE 7.1 Overview of South African defence budgetary allocations during the past decade 
SA Defence Budget & Related Figures, 2008‑2017















2008 2.28tr 27.8 1.21% 11.8% 8.27 62,082 15,071
2009 2.08tr 32.0bn 1.58% 7.2% 7.36 62,082 15,071
2010 2.68tr 30.7bn 1.14% 5.8% 7.40 62,082 15,071
2011 2.95tr 30.4bn 1.03% 5.9% 7.09 62,082 15,071
2012 3.2tr 37.9bn 1.18% 5.64% 8.20 62,082 15,071
2013 3.46tr 44.6bn 1.28% 5.77% 9.20 62,100 15,050
2014 3.65tr 42.8bn 1.17% 6.3% 10.69 62,100 15,050
2015 4.03tr 44.6bn 1.11% 4.8% 12.72 62,100 15,050
2016 4.28tr 47.2bn 1.09% 6.4% 15.26 62,100 15,050
2017 4.61tr 48.6bn 1.05% 5.4% 13.40 66,350 15,050
SOURCE: The Military Balance, 2009‑20184
It is clear that the South African inflation rate over the past decade has neutralised the 
effects of  any nominal growth in the defence budget. The table provides an indication 
of  the extent to which the Rand (ZAR) declined in value against foreign currencies, and 
the increasingly unfavourable foreign exchange rate compounded the damaging effects of 
the inflation rate on South African defence spending. The currency exchange rate directly 
affects not only main equipment acquisition costs, but also the cost of  refits, maintenance, 
training and other services provided by armament system suppliers. 
Table 7.1 further demonstrates how the defence budget declined to about 1% of  the 
South African GDP, although the current minister of  defence (Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula) 
and her predecessor (Lindiwe Sisulu) both called for a defence budget amounting to at 
least 2% of  the GDP. That percentage, if  provided and sustained, would have enabled the 
SANDF to rebuild itself  over a period of  about 20 years. 
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Sustained overstretch 
Table 7.1 demonstrates that SANDF personnel numbers have changed little over the past 
decade. Amongst other things, growth in SANDF foreign deployments did not result in a 
significant growth of  personnel numbers. Figure 7.2 below provides an indication of  the 
annual number of  SANDF members deployed on UN peacekeeping missions from 1999 
to 2018.
FIGURE 7.2 Number of SANDF members on UN peacekeeping missions, 1999‑2018
                                                SOURCE: De Carvalho, 2018
Unchanging personnel numbers had a direct impact on any personnel shortages 
experienced by the SANDF during the past decade. For example, in 2008 the SAAF had 
only 38% of  its target strength in fighter pilots and 60% in fighter aircraft technicians. It 
also had only 72% of  its helicopter pilots and 68% of  its helicopter technicians. The air 
transport force had 68% of  its target pilot quota and 59% of  its technicians.5 Persistent 
and significant personnel and budgeting shortages strain or overstretch a workforce, and 
the DOD Annual Report 2010/2011 mentioned overstretch specifically. The SA Army 
is referred to as ‘severely overstretched, especially in the infantry, engineer and support 
capabilities.’6   The Air Force fared no better,7 while the SA Navy ‘continued to experience 
critical shortages of  personnel within the technical, combat, diver, submariner and 
logistics domains’.8 
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Any increase in personnel costs during the past decade cannot be attributed to a manpower 
increase, and this is especially interesting when one considers personnel costs as a 
percentage of  the defence budget. Increasing percentages of  the defence budget have 
been spent on personnel costs over the past 14 years. About 30% of  the 2004 budget was 
allocated to personnel costs,9 while the percentage of  the 2016 budget was 57%10 and 80% 
for the 2017 budget. During the course of  2017, the Defence Ministry announced plans to 
reduce the numbers of  military personnel to 66,016 by 2019.11 If  the funding allocation for 
personnel cannot be increased, the Minister of  Defence has no choice but to reduce their 
numbers, or at least cut remuneration and/or staff  at high-ranking levels. 
Defence policy implications
In May 2018, the Minister of  Defence reminded parliament that they had endorsed the 
2015 Defence Review as the national policy on defence but that the Defence Review 
remained unfunded. The declining budgetary allocation has reached the stage where 
the SANDF is losing essential capabilities. Given the expected current and future tasks 
of  the SANDF, such expectations cannot be executed. The defence policy implications 
of  sustained underfunding are clear. Sustained underfunding will increasingly amount 
to a contradiction of  the South African defence policy, as articulated in the 2015 Defence 
Review, and continued underfunding reduced the status of  the 2015 Defence Review to a 
relatively toothless policy.12 
Notes
1 An African concept implying recognition of  and abiding by reciprocal dignity and human-centredness.
2 In terms of  the collective regional GDP in 2003/2003, South Africa held 74.9%, Angola 4,2%, 
Zimbabwe 4,2%, and Tanzania 3,9%, while Mozambique stood at 1,6%, the DRC at 2,6%, Zambia 
1,6%, Swaziland at 0,5%, and Lesotho at 0,4%.
3 South Africa’s Gini coefficient for the African population increased from 0,62 in 1991 to 0,72 in 2001 
(HSRC, 2004). On the World Bank Gini Index, South Africa finds itself  at 67%, ahead of  Angola 
(59%), Bolivia (57%), the Central African Republic (56%), the Comoros (64%), Haiti (60%), Lesotho 
(53%), Zambia (51%) and Zimbabwe (50%). Within the region, only the Namibians were worse 
off  at the time and rated 70% (Schwabe, 2004). In 2016, it was reported that the Gini coefficient 
increased from 0.61 (all population groups) in 1996 to 0.64 by 2014 (SAIRR, 2016:313ff.).
4 Table 7.1 is based on data collected from ten consecutive issues of  The Military Balance, annually 
published online. These are: 109(1):319-320, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597220802709910 [30 Jan 2009]; 
110(1):325-326, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597220903545858 [3 Feb 2010]; 111(1):441-443, https://doi. 
org/10.1080/04597222.2011.559842 [7 Mar 2011]; 112(1):452-454, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222. 
2012.663218 [7 Mar 2012]; 113(1):530-532, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2013.757005 [14 Mar 
2013]; 114(1):457-459, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2014.871886 [5 Feb 2014]; 115(1):468-470, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2015.996365 [10 Feb 2015]; 116(1):467-469, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
04597222.2016.1127636 [9 Feb 2016]; 117(1):534-537, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2017.1271216 
[13 Feb 2017]; 118(1):433-434, 485-487, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416986 [13 Feb 2018]. 
5 The Military Balance, 110(1):292, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597220903545858 [3 Feb 2010]. 
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6 Annual Report 2010/2011, p. 61. Department of  Defence, Republic of  South Africa, 2011. Available 
on the DOD website: www.dod.mil.za
7 Ibid., p. 68. 
8 Ibid., p. 74. 
9 The Military Balance, 110(1):292, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597220903545858 [3 Feb 2010]. 
10 The Military Balance, 117(1):488, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2017.1271216 [13 Feb 2017].
11 The Military Balance, 118(1):433-434, https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416986 [13 Feb 2018]. 
12 The following articles, published on defenceWeb (http://www.defenceweb.co.za), support the 
arguments made in the Appendix: ‘Alarming issues’ uncovered on border fact-finding mission 
(30 November 2018); ‘Critical maintenance events’ impact on SAAF maritime patrol capabilities 
(9 November 2018); Acknowledgement all is not well with the SANDF comes from the top 
(5 November 2018); Alternative funding, models needed for SA defence industry – Armscor 
(24 October 2018); Defence Legal Services will be impaired by lack of  funds (11 April 2018); Defence 
Minister needs a hearts and mind campaign and a retrenchment plan (6 June 2018); Defence Review 
– no money, so no implementation (11 October 2018); Defence Review 2015 unlikely to ever be 
fully implemented (published on 29 November 2018); Navy Defence acknowledges it is in danger 
of  sinking (5 June 2018); Navy deteriorating, Parliamentary Committee hears (26 November 
2018); SA Navy funding and capacity need careful consideration – ISS (16 July 2018); SANDF 
suspensions cost millions (26 September 2018); Slow progress with DOD financial misconduct 
disciplinary proceedings (13 April 2018); Speech: Defence and Military Veterans Budget Vote 2018-19 
(25 May 2018); Yam bemoans underfunded SANDF (18 October 2018). 
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